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Making the case for Crew-Centered Design (CCD) in merchant shipping 
 
Aditi Katariaa, Gesa Praetoriusa, Jens-Uwe Schröder-Hinrichsa,  Michael Baldaufa 
 
aMaritime Risk and System Safety (MaRiSa) Group, World Maritime University, Malmö, SWEDEN 
 
 
Since 2003, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has emphasised the need to address and 
integrate ergonomics knowledge in a concerted manner. However, there is little guidance on the 
application of this knowledge in the design of merchant vessels. Utilizing a mixed methods approach, 
the paper identifies the need for crew-centered design (CCD), highlighting the importance of using 
concepts derived from Human-Centred Design (HCD) to be able to design work spaces and 
operational procedures that facilitate the work of the crew on board. Drawing upon results obtained 
from accident analysis (utilising the Technique for the Retrospective and predictive Analysis of 
Cognitive Errors - TRACEr) and 24 semi-structured interviews, this paper identifies areas in which it 
could be potentially beneficial to integrate end-users in the design of ships and shipborne operations. 
This paper further discusses why and how concepts rooted in HCD could be used to improve maritime 
workspace and interface design, as well as the design of procedures and shipborne operations. 
However, due to the specifics of the maritime domain, the authors propose that there is the need to 
expand the HCD perspective, making the design not only fit a single user, but to fit the crew as part of 
a maritime socio-technical system. The paper discusses that the case for CCD is imperative in the 
interest of safety, efficiency and even makes economic sense.  
 
Practitioner Summary: This paper utilizes a mixed methods approach comprising accident analysis 
and 24 interviews with seafarers and a company representative, to make a case crew-centered design 
(CCD). CCD is based on concepts derived from human-centered design (HCD) and expands these to 
encompass the whole crew on-board and not only a single user. Identification of the need for HCD is a 
prerequisite to the iterative human-centred design cycle (ISO:9241-210 2010) which enables HCD 
practitioners to develop solutions with the end goal to satisfy user and organisational requirements. 
This paper identifies the need for undertaking CCD in the specific ship-board context, thus linking 
CCD with HCD.   
 
Keywords: Crew-centered design (CCD), Human-Centred Design (HCD), human element, and 
accident analysis, TRACEr   
 
 
1. Introduction 
The maritime transport system forms the backbone of the world economy with nearly 90% of the 
international world trade being carried out by the sea (ICS). There has been a considerable growth in 
international seaborne trade over the past decades and the world fleet has consequentially expanded to 
meet the growing demand for shipping (UNCTAD 2014). More than just a mode of cheap transport, maritime 
transport is a transnational intricate linkage of complex supply chains between the world economies 
(Bonacich and Wilson 2008). 
Vessels within the maritime transportation system can be considered as complex socio-technical 
systems comprising interacting social (crew and shipping operators) and technical elements (equipment, 
machinery and technology) (Praetorius and Lützhöft 2011).  
The human-machine interface has featured in serious maritime casualties that caused irreparable loss 
to life and property. One example is the collision of the Andrea Doria and Stockholm. It is, but one example 
of how the technology introduced to improve safety was used to push for more efficiency in terms of 
proceeding faster. The two vessels had seen each other, but still collided (Perrow 1984).  The role of 
automation has been identified in the grounding of the Royal Majesty; it has been argued that automation 
alters the task it was intended to support, creates new errors paths, shifts consequences of error further into 
the future and delays opportunities for error detection and recovery (Lützhöft and Dekker 2002).  
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While often referred to as the source of error (Baker and Seah 2004), the perspective on human 
operators working on board of merchant vessels has changed through the past 15 years. The IMO has 
increasingly tried to emphasize the role of the human element as a complex and multi-facetted aspect, which 
often represents the last safeguard to maritime safety. Therefore the organization’s human element vision 
has been adopted and several circulars have been provided that highlight the need to support the mariners 
on-board by integrating ergonomics in the design of maritime equipment (IMO 2003, 2006a, b, c) 
However, while a large body of scientific literature addresses decision-support systems and interface 
design (Porathe et al. 2013; Benedict et al. 2014), there is a lack of research with regard to how to integrate 
end-users, mariners, into the design of work spaces and procedures in maritime operations. This article 
presents results based on the work conducted within the CyClaDes project. CyClaDes stands for crew-
centered design of ships and ship systems and aims to identify, locate, apply and disseminate knowledge on 
how to best integrate end-users in the design of maritime systems to create safe, efficient and resilient 
maritime operations. The project is funded by the European Commission under the 7th Framework 
Programme and has a multi-disciplinary consortium comprising 14 partners drawn from the academia and 
industry. 
This article attempts to show that concepts derived from HCD can be extended to fit the specific settings 
of the maritime domain, and that this offers an opportunity to make operations and workspaces that support 
the work on-board, safe. Results from an accident analysis conducted with the TRACEr taxonomy, as well as 
the results from 24 semi-structured interviews (with 23 mariners and 1 company representative), will be used 
to highlight how poor design compromises safety and efficiency and can even have an economic cost 
attached. The paper concludes by presenting the concept of crew-centered design and discusses how this 
can be used to improve the preconditions for safe and successful maritime operations. 
 
 
2. Background 
Human-centered design (HCD) is an approach to the design of interactive systems and aims to make these 
more usable through the application of ergonomics and usability knowledge. It advocates an interactive 
design process focused on understanding the user, task and environment through end-user involvement 
throughout the whole process. The output of the HCD process are systems that have the potential to 
increase the overall system performance, for e.g. amongst others, decreased stress or discomfort, increased 
usability, or being easier to use in terms of a lesser need for training. The iterative HCD cycle adapted from 
(ISO:9241-210 2010), is presented in figure 1 and the HCD cycle and usability can be integrated with the 
general design diagram (ship design spiral) (Evans 1959) as appropriate. 
One goal of the HCD approach is to increase a system’s usability. Usability is defined as the extent to 
which a product can be used by specified users to achieve specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency and 
satisfaction in a specified context of use (ISO:9241-11 1998). It emphasizes the need to consider, not only 
efficiency and effectiveness, but also the specific context in which a product’s use or process is situated in. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.    The human-centred design cycle (adapted from: ISO 9241-210, 2010) 
 
Identify the need for 
human-centred design 
Understand and specify 
the context of use 
Specify the user and 
organisational 
requirements 
Produce design 
solutions 
Evaluate design 
against requirements 
System satisfies specified 
user and organizational 
requirements 
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Earthy and Sherwood-Jones (2010) analyse standards for HCD in the context of ship systems. They 
suggest that a human-centred approach within the design process has the potential to address the human 
element quickly and effectively. Success factors of User-Centred Design (UCD) in shipping are explored 
utilising focus groups by Costa and Lützhöft (2014). The meanings and the perceived benefits of UCD are 
categorised and presented by the authors, who further state that importance of the approach to end users, 
can serve as an incentive for shipping companies and designers to adopt the same.  Bligard et al. (2014), 
utilised 2D and 3D models as mediating tools to elicit end user feedback during the workplace design 
process. The authors found that diverse model types allow for different levels of reflection and interrogation 
of design by the prospective end users. The authors further add that mediating models to obtain end user 
feedback on design in a cost effective manner can greatly benefit design teams.  
Petersen et al. (2011) note that academic literature lacks accounts of systematic application of maritime 
human factors. The authors go on to further state that with limited market demand and the lack of rules, the 
initiative for application remains largely with individual organisations. An economic case for design in 
shipping has been made by Österman (2012) who argues that the design case needs to be strengthened by 
highlighting economic gains for ship operators in addition to highlighting the design contribution to safety and 
efficiency (also see Österman 2013) 
Reducing crew levels, increasing levels of automation, computerisation and administrative workload in 
the on-board environment have altered traditional roles at sea; Ljung (2010) suggests a functional approach 
towards achieving optimised manning with the integration of flexibility. The author discusses functional 
flexibility and working time flexibility and argues that with the combination of functional flexibility with job 
enrichment and continuous professional development with working time flexibility, the ground for a win-win 
situation between seafarers and shipping companies can be laid. The author further argues for a holistic 
approach when strategizing for change. For on-board work organisation and function-based manning, also 
see Ljung and Lützhöft (2014). 
 
 
3. Research methodology 
A mixed methods approach comprising accident analysis and semi-structured interviews was utilised in the 
study. In the first phase, the accident analysis of 129 publicly available accident investigation reports was 
carried out utilising the TRACEr taxonomy for the coding and subsequent analysis of the accident data with 
the aid of the MaRiSa database (2013). TRACEr was developed by Shorrock and Kirwan (2002) for research 
within Air traffic Control. TRACEr was chosen for the accident analysis in the maritime domain as it 
addresses the human-machine interface, is both retrospective and predictive in its outlook and addresses 
error recovery. TRACEr has a modular structure comprising eight inter-related taxonomies. These 
taxonomies can be divided into those which describe the context of the incident, those that describe the 
cognitive background of the production of an error and those relating to the recovery of the incident. TRACEr 
needed to be adapted to the maritime context for the purpose of the study (see figure 2).	  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
Figure 2.    TRACEr Framework adapted for 
CyClaDes  
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In addition to the accident analysis, the study involved semi-structured interviews with 24 participants 
(23 seafarers and 1 company representative). Of the 23 individuals with seafaring experience, 1 was a 
female deck cadet and 22 were male participants. Of the 22 male interviewees, 18 were from the navigation 
department and 4 from the engine department. The company representative interviewed was also male. A 
semi-structured interview guide was designed for the study which focused on the design of spaces, 
equipment and operations on-board. Participants were encouraged to share instances where they believed 
the design of equipment and/or space did not support their work and was not fit for purpose and accidents 
which they knew of, in which design played a role. Each interview lasted for 45 minutes on an average. 
 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1    Accident analysis  
Two-thirds of the 129 accidents coded involved human-machine interaction. The largest category of 
accidents on-board is personal accidents (44%), followed by collisions (29%), grounding (15%) and fire (4%) 
in descending order (see figure 4). Accidents and consequential injuries to personnel feature prominently in 
the analysed data. Underlying issues to the accidents reveal the role of design or lack of it, in shipboard 
equipment, space design and layout. The highest number of accidents were attributed to the bridge (50%), 
followed by the deck (38%) and the engine room (12%). This finding is unsurprising as the bridge is the 
command and control centre of the vessel and most accidents have been attributable to personnel, decisions 
and equipment on the bridge. In 66 % of the cases there was mitigated loss in which the vessels regained 
operation while in a substantial 34% of the cases there was a total loss of the vessel.  
A high, 19% of errors in the reported accidents are attributed to the Captain, followed by the Chief 
Officer (14%), Able Bodied Seaman (AB) (9%) and Pilot (8%). The tasks which led to the task errors are 
navigation (23%), followed by traffic monitoring (18%), cargo work (18%), maintenance work (15%) and 
mooring operations (4%). The user materials involved in the task errors are identified in the data as radar 
(64), loading devices (13), mooring equipment (11), stairs, ladders (11), steering panel (11), engine room 
controls (10), Very High Frequency (VHF) radio (10) etc. in that order.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.    Type of accidents  
 
 
4.2    Results of interviews  
This section presents the results of the semi-structured interviews. Each of the 24 interviews was transcribed 
verbatim and the data sorted thematically. Across the board interviewees shared examples of experiences of 
poor usability on-board, in which the equipment and/or the layout was unfit for purpose and did not support 
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the task/operation undertaken by the seafarers. In relation to the on-board work environment, it was further 
stated that the seafarers do not have the option to stop work as they have a limited manpower and their work 
environment is unique in the sense that they live and work on-board the ship for the duration of the contract 
and unlike other shore-based workers, do not have the option of returning home at the end of the day’s shift. 
By and large, as far as possible the seafarers tended to figure out local solutions to deal with the usability 
related constraints and continued their work. Two quotes from respondents given below are illustrative of 
how they perceive design and shipboard work. The responses of the seafarers point to the perceived 
immutable fixed character of on-board design which they largely could not alter and they needed to work with 
what was made available to them. 
 
“I tend to overlook the design … my main impression is that when you see a problem, you sort it out”  
 
“You cannot change the design” 
 
Location of equipment and/or machinery, space for crew movement and access to the same is vital for 
seafarers in their on-board operations. A respondent observed that an increase in cargo carrying capacity 
restricted the space available on container ships. Adequate space between stowed containers with catwalks 
would be supportive in the work. However he further added that it appeared that money appeared to be a 
deciding factor as the company focus appeared to be more on cargo carrying capacity that generated 
revenue rather than adequate crew access. On the issue of ladders, the same respondent noted that vertical 
ladders caused fatigue and access points, ladders and walkways could be improved with good design. 
Another respondent stated that shipping yards did not consider that once something is fit, it would need 
to be opened, cleaned, maintained and repaired, and on-board personnel will not have access to similar 
advanced tools as the shipyard. According to the respondent it would be useful to have dedicated cleaning 
areas between floors, where you can open the panel and isolate sections and carry out cleaning of drains 
and pipes if required. Regarding pipes and manifolds, he added that the designers and builders should 
consider how users will open the pipe, repair it or change the pipe if required. The respondent further added 
that at times 5-6 pipes are put in a bundle on top of one another and to get to one pipe, one ended up 
opening and disturbing a lot of others. It would be preferred if the pipes could be spread out but that would 
take space. The present location of the pipes was rather low according to the interviewee, who felt that near 
the bottom plate, it was very corrosive for the pipes. In relation to the pipes, the interviewee spoke of uneven 
walkways on tankers that move up and down in relation to the layout of the pipes and was stated to be a 
hazard in the dark. 
Each time seafarers join a ship, they could be faced with different design solutions on-board with 
respect to space layout, equipment and operations. Standardisation of equipment was one of the key 
concerns for interviewees who felt that fleet wide, within a company there should be standardised equipment 
as that has issues for safety, efficiency and re-familiarisation training. A respondent added that if one is 
aware of one’s next employment on a particular class of vessels, then one could read about the equipment 
prior to joining and familiarise oneself.  
Endemic ‘light pollution’ was identified on the bridge by the interviewees as it impacted visibility and 
could impact safety. Display visibility and customisation of monitors/screens was considered very important 
by the respondents and they wished to be able to appropriately adjust the light settings for each. Availability 
of suitable dimmers for the bridge equipment would be viable solutions. 
Alarms were considered extremely important and intelligent alarm management systems were the need 
of the hour on-board. On the issue of alarms, respondents noted that sometimes there were too many of 
them, for instance from the ARPA due to sea clutter, in which case there was the tendency to turn the alarms 
off and not to use them. The tediousness of the bridge watch keeping alarm which required to be physically 
turned off, prompted one Captain to tell the crew to turn it off. Alarms have been introduced to promote 
safety on-board but can be an irritant and unsupportive of the work on-board due to poor usability. 
Mooring operations were considered dangerous by almost all of the respondents and suggestions were 
made to improve the design of mooring winches, windlass, rollers and location of the bollards on the deck to 
avoid obstruction. The line of sight was considered important in dangerous mooring operations and it was 
suggested that the location of the mooring winches, windlass etc. should be such that the person can see 
and have an overview of the operations. Due to limited manning, one respondent suggested hands free 
communication during critical mooring operations. An interviewee recounted an incident of a fatality during 
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mooring operations in which design appeared to have played a role. The ship had additional mooring 
controls far up front so that the individual could see over the flair; over the gun valve. There was no 
protection in this exposed position and the officer continued to heave and make the rope tight -  
 
“The rope parted … like a sword… and then they saw the chief officer standing there without the head…they 
found his head two holds away.”  
 
Rigging the pilot ladder is an important aspect for pilot boarding operations. One interviewee felt that the 
crew found it difficult to do it safely in inclement weather and there have been instances of individuals going 
over-board. He suggested that an improved mechanism should be put in place which could be used to lower 
and retrieve pilot ladders without risk to crew and further added that CCTV for the deck area would be useful 
for monitoring the space. Adequate stowage for pilot ladders and securing equipment at a suitable location 
on the deck is desired to prevent ladders from wear and tear. 
Emergency drills involving life boat testing was also a cause for concern for some respondents. One 
recounted a fatality during lifeboat lowering when one clamp opened and the other didn’t and the lifeboat 
went vertically down and the person inside suffered an impact to his head and died of brain haemorrhage. 
The interviewee said that either both clamps should open at the same time or none should open but it should 
never be the case that one opens and the other doesn’t. The interviewee further added –   
 
“No one dares to sit inside the lifeboat while dropping it. The main aim of the free fall lifeboat is you sit inside, 
then you use the hydraulic jack to release the gear and it goes back, but the impact will be too high and you 
are not well secured. You have belts …you have your head straps here, but it is so designed that it never fits 
you. It is too high or it is too low. So it never suits you.” 
 
Navigating officers mentioned the following equipment for improvement – Automatic Identification 
System (AIS), oily water separator (OWS), gangway, pilot ladder, echo sounder, electronic char display and 
information system (ECDIS), display interface, mooring winches, windlass, hatch covers, alarms, pipes and 
manifolds. With respect to equipment characteristics, respondents considered the following important –  
standardisation of equipment, easy operation, display visibility in different light conditions, customised 
display options, availability and adaptability of alarms, location of equipment and labels. With respect to 
essential characteristics of bridge layout, they preferred location of equipment, sufficient space for work, 
appropriate lighting arrangements and line of sight. For deck equipment, strength of equipment was 
important and for deck layout, markings and signage and free from obstructions was important. Interviewees 
considered ballasting operations, mooring operations, cargo operations and navigation in restricted and/or 
congested areas as important. 
For the engine department interviewees, maintenance is a very important part of their daily work on 
board. The location of machinery/equipment/valves/pipes that require maintenance should be easy to access 
and support the work of the engineers. Largely things are difficult to access. In one instance the platform 
needed to be opened to reach the pipe and it would be useful if the pipes were a little higher. The local 
solution devised was to make a sign/label identifying the location of the valve and the connection of a long 
spanner so that no bending was required to open it. In connection with a leaking generator, it was difficult to 
replace the platform below the generator as it was difficult to lift and align the 500 Kg platform. In case of 
breakdown, portable replacement and easy dismantling of accessories should be considered in design. 
Remote monitoring was considered useful by engineers who believed that all equipment should also 
have remote controls in addition to the equipment panels. The remote device can be kept in the engine 
control room and other colleagues can communicate regarding the situation in other parts of the engine. 
During bunkering operations, the remote monitoring of the tank levels was found to be very useful. 
Monitoring vital parameters remotely from the cabins was also considered useful for ships designed for 
unmanned engine spaces. 
Starting the generators with heavy fuel oil was a concern in cold countries for an interviewee, where due 
to the low temperatures the generators would not instantly start. The poor design included only one heater 
for three generators and the generator closest to the heater started but the generator farthest from the heater 
could not start. In order to start the generator at the far end, the interviewee and his colleagues continuously 
needed to give a kick to the reducing valve thereby damaging it and necessitating its replacement. A small 
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heater had been provided to save energy and it resulted in the reducing valve of the generator getting 
damaged. This has attendant economic costs of replacing damaged machinery/equipment. 
Engine room operations are extremely hazardous. One fourth engineer recalled that in his company he 
was aware of as many as 3 fatalities in connection with the purifier. One engineer had forgotten to put the 
locking knot in place and as there was no alarm alerting him that a crucial step had been missed. The 
interviewee further said that the purifier should not have started without the locking knot in place.  
 
“It started without the locking knot and purifier has something like 200 blades moving at 10,000 rpm, it 
came off. So it is like the blades come flying everywhere so it cut... It is like a cutting a person up… if you 
have forgotten to put a locking knot, it is very small. You may forget to put it. So there should be an 
automation that if you forget to put it, the purifier should not work, should not start and give an alarm.” 
 
The interviewees from the engine department wished to improve the purifier, ballast water pumps, 
generators and increased access to communication equipment in engine room spaces. The characteristics 
considered important by interviewees regarding engine equipment were: easy operation, maintenance, 
replacement of spare parts, easy access, suitable location of equipment and controls, easy monitoring vital 
parameters, availability and adaptability of alarms and equipment labels. In terms of the characteristics of 
engine room layout, the interviewees mentioned sufficient space for work, temperature and noise. It was 
noted that the problem of noise was more acute on smaller vessels and not in big vessels as steady 
equipment noise was considered a sign of well-functioning equipment. For the engineers, key operations 
were ballasting, bunkering, maintenance work, working with power generation equipment like the generators 
and monitoring vital parameters.  
The main obstacle to design and usability was ‘money’ as perceived by the shipping company owner. 
 
 
5. Discussion of results 
The accident analysis (section 4.1) shows that poor design has a role to play in accidents. The type of 
accidents (personal, grounding, collision, fire etc.); on-board spaces to which accidents are attributed (bridge, 
deck and engine room); user tasks involved in accidents (navigation, maintenance, cargo work etc.); 
involved user materials (radar, loading devices, mooring equipment etc.) highlight the areas where CCD and 
usability can make a positive contribution to safety. The accident analysis makes a case for CCD with 
respect to the safety of operational work, life, property and the environment. 
Unfit for purpose and poor usability is a key finding throughout the interview data. Seafarers regularly 
compromise, and work with poor design on-board. In several examples, the equipment/machinery/space has 
been identified as unsuitable and unsupportive of the crew; and poor design does not lead to effective and 
efficient operational performance, and is dissatisfactory in the context of use. Iterative HCD (ISO:9241-210 
2010) and usability (ISO:9241-11 1998) need to be integrated in ship design (Evans, 1959), and crew 
involvement should be sought from the beginning to achieve usability (see Earthy and Sherwood-Jones 
2010; Bligard et al. 2014). Personal injuries, fatalities and damage to equipment due to poor usability, come 
with attendant costs and contribute to bolster an economic case for design as put forth by Österman (2013). 
The crew on-board undertake diverse tasks with incumbent functions – navigating, traffic monitoring, 
ballasting, mooring, bunkering etc. The tasks cannot be performed safely, effectively efficiently and 
satisfactorily due to poor design support. Function based, flexible manning with continuous professional 
development could be considered by shipping operators to promote safety, contribute to the design of 
improved shipboard operations, optimise available resources and support the crew as they serve on-board 
different vessels in the company fleet during their seagoing career   (Ljung 2010; Ljung and Lützhöft 2014)   
Costa and Lützhöft (2014) highlight the importance of design for end users and state that it could serve 
as an incentive to consider design, while this paper provides empirical data to make the case for CCD. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
HCD is generic and focuses on the human in the design process. The authors draw upon HCD and usability, 
and propose the expansion of HCD to encompass the whole crew of the ship and take a crew-centric design 
focus with respect to ship and operational design, with CCD. Shipboard operations like mooring, involve 
Proceedings 19th Triennial Congress of the IEA, Melbourne 9-14 August 2015 
	   8	  
several crew members at once and CCD could address the unique and complex in-situ operational context 
on-board. A ship has the distinction of simultaneously being the workplace as well as the leisure space for 
crew for the duration of their contract; crew work and live there; and to support them in their work and life on-
board, HCD would be limiting and therefore an expansion of it to embrace the crew with CCD is proposed. 
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